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This Fed Letter summarizes a work-
ing paper released by the Econom-
ic Research Department of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
which applies an economic analysis
to the subject of clearing facilities
for multilaterally net trades.1  By
highlighting the aspects of such
facilities that may increase the vul-
nerability of the financial markets
to systemic risk, Hanley et al.
(1995) establish the interest of
central banks in monitoring and/
or regulating their activities.
Multilateral netting is the process of
offsetting gross payment obligations
among several counterparties with
new transactions which may serve to
either increase or decrease the orig-
inal obligations.  It can be thought
of as keeping a running total of
monies owed between all partici-
pants in a facility.  Where bilateral
netting is conducted only between
two counterparties, multilateral
netting allows for three or more
parties to reduce multiple transac-
tions to one net pay (or collect)
amount.
Multilateral clearing facilities offer
many services—trade acknowledg-
ment, netting arrangements, guaran-
tees of contractual performance and
surveillance of counterparties—
which must be carefully structured to
minimize financial disruptions.  In
addition, the rapid growth of deriva-
tive products requires careful consid-
eration of the unique risks associated
with clearing and guaranteeing these
instruments.  Multilateral netting
facilities offer significant benefits
and risk-reducing attributes.  Howev-
er, without appropriate structural
characteristics, these facilities may
increase the fragility of the financial
system by concentrating risk in a
single entity.  Clearing facilities’
routing of payments and deliveries
through a central point (or node)
creates a choke point.  A facility’s
design determines its ability to with-
stand market disruptions which may
carry systemic implications.
In November 1990, a report by a
committee of representatives from
the Bank for International Settle-
ments and the central banks of the
G-10 nations (the “Lamfalussy Re-
port”) proposed six minimum oper-
ating standards for foreign exchange
clearing facilities.2  Attempts to apply
those standards to all types of multi-
lateral netting, however, have not
always produced satisfactory results.
The application of these standards
to facilities and situations which
differ from the original target of the
study has given rise to inconsisten-
cies in interpretation.  Currently,
more comprehensive standards are
required, which would not only ex-
tend the analysis to clearing of all
financial products, but would also
raise the minimum operating stan-
dards to a higher level.  Standards
proposed by Hanley et al. (1995)
would apply to all facilities that con-
duct multilateral clearing.  These
standards would provide stronger
safeguards against systemic risk than
presently exist, as well as a measure
of consistency across facilities.
Risks arising from
multilateral clearing
The risks associated with the pres-
ence of multilateral clearing facilities
are cross-system, operational, credit,
and legal.
Cross-system risk promises to be-
come increasingly important as
exchanges try to enhance their ser-
vices by allowing margin offsets of
like products traded on different
exchanges, and as increased inter-
nationalization of markets contin-
ues to blur the lines between similar
products on different exchanges.  A
real-world example of the damage
that can result from a lack of atten-
tion to this area was offered early in
1995 when the derivatives positions
of Barings Bank caused its collapse.
The lack of formal cooperation
between the two futures exchanges
involved definitely contributed to
the enormous size of the bank’s
concealed losses.
Satisfactory standards for legal and
operational risk have been estab-
lished by industry practitioners and
regulators.  However, Hanley et al.
(1995) suggest enhancements to
the standards in these areas, aimed
at improving the management of
these risks.  The issue of interna-
tional cooperation in developing
more standardized legal treatment
of financial obligations is beginning
to receive greater attention, but
material progress may take several
years.
Credit risk and liquidity risk have
often been treated as a single is-
sue, largely because in a payments
situation, it is difficult (and inad-
visable) to distinguish between the
two.  In netting schemes involving
contracts for deferred payments,
however, credit and liquidity risks
are best considered separately.
Hanley et al. (1995) emphasizethose distinctions and develop
comprehensive standards to address
each risk independently.
Facility attributes that guide
standards
The primary functions that are im-
portant in assessing the potential
systemic risk associated with a clear-
ing facility include: the loss-sharing
arrangement (centralized or decen-
tralized); the management of risk
(centralized or decentralized); and
the management of liquidity expo-
sure, if administered centrally.
The type of loss-sharing arrange-
ment has significant risk implica-
tions for facilities’ membership.
When loss-sharing is centralized (mutu-
alized among survivors), all mem-
bers bear exposure to all others,
regardless of whether they specifi-
cally transacted with the defaulting
counterparty.  In most cases, substi-
tution of a central counterparty
(the facility) means that pledged
assets of the members will be ex-
hausted before additional assess-
ments are made of the membership.
With such an arrangement, individ-
ual members have weak incentives
to bear the cost of determining the
financial strength of each member
in the facility.  However, their ancil-
lary exposure to all others in the
facility gives them an incentive to
cooperate in managing their mutu-
al exposure to risk.  It is important
that the safeguards employed to
manage this risk—capital standards,
collateral standards, marking to
market and position limits—are
administered carefully and systemat-
ically to minimize the potential risk
to the financial system.  The stan-
dards Hanley et al. (1995) propose
include specific guidelines for the
management of those safeguards.
When the loss-sharing arrangement is
decentralized, members bear expo-
sure only to those counterparties
with whom they transact directly.
This arrangement means that inde-
pendent credit monitoring of
counterparties should be conduct-
ed as stringently as it is on a purely
bilateral basis, since participants
continue to be exposed to net bilat-
eral obligations.  Thus, it is essential
that, despite the netting of payment
and settlement obligations, partici-
pants fully understand the effect of
the netting on their credit expo-
sures and monitor that exposure
rigorously.  Obligations to the clear-
ing facility and to other members
must be transparent at all times—
never obscured by the netting
scheme.  Because parties bear the
risk associated with their choice of
counterparty, they have the incen-
tive to manage those risks as well
rather than relying on a third party.
This is referred to as decentralized
risk management and it is compatible
only with decentralized loss-sharing
arrangements.
Centralized risk management is a com-
plement to a centralized loss-shar-
ing design.  Because risk is posed
primarily to the viability of the facil-
ity itself, management must choose
the risk-management tools that are
best suited to insulate the facility
from a debilitating exposure.  This
implies that the facility’s manage-
ment must bear the responsibility
for monitoring the solvency and
exposures of all members, relieving
the membership of the need to
monitor each other.  Thus, the in-
terests of management (preserving
the facility as an ongoing concern)
are aligned with the risks they seek
to mitigate.
Certain facilities, however, may
offer centralized risk management
(transactions are novated3) in combi-
nation with a decentralized loss-sharing
arrangement.  In this scenario, con-
tract “fails” return the credit expo-
sures of the contracting parties to
the status they had prior to the no-
vation.  This arrangement could
cause obfuscation when participants
track their net exposures, but bear
residual exposure to gross credit
risks. Such an arrangement raises
questions:  How vigorous will the
risk management be when the facili-
ty itself is not exposed to risk in a
fail situation?  Will individual mem-
bers reduce their own risk monitor-
ing in favor of that conducted by
the central facility, despite the fact
that they ultimately are exposed to
the same degree as in a bilateral
netting situation?  There is an in-
herent misalignment of interests
created by the absence of the risk
mutualization provision (which
would place the facility itself at
risk).  Consequently, the standards
suggested by Hanley et al. (1995)
offer guidance to regulators faced
with approving/monitoring
schemes offering centralized risk
management and decentralized
loss-sharing.
In addition, systemic issues could
arise if a facility adopts central man-
agement of liquidity exposure.  Partici-
pants may be called upon to pro-
vide liquidity as a result of actions of
others in the facility with whom they
did not transact.  The presence of
the safety net may diminish their
incentives to adopt robust liquidity
provisions, heightening the need
for regulation.  The Lamfalussy
Report suggested a liquidity stan-
dard which would guarantee that
the facility could make timely settle-
ment, even if the participant with
the biggest “pay” to the facility—the
“largest net debit”—defaulted.  Two
important problems arise when
applying this standard: 1) It is diffi-
cult to ensure and demonstrate
adherence to a designation based
on a dollar amount that is not static
and is impossible to forecast; and
2) When access to liquid assets is
correlated across participants, the
likelihood of multiple participants
being unable to make timely pay-
ment is increased.  Consequently,
adherence to the standard may
provide fairly limited protection in
certain cases.  While acknowledging
that protection from failure can
never be assured, one standard
proposed by Hanley et al. (1995)
approaches this problem from a
different—economic—perspective.Adequate liquidity provisions
should reflect the nature of the
products cleared as well as the com-
position of the membership.
Conclusion
Regulators and financial industry
participants have learned a great
deal about sound risk-management
procedures in recent years.  For
regulators, the threat of systemic
risk has burgeoned with the massive
advances in product design and risk
allocation.  Tests of existing safe-
guards have, thus far, proven to be
adequate.  Nevertheless, we cannot
adopt a complacent attitude when it
comes to issues of systemic risk;
there is always room for improve-
ment.  Hanley et al. (1995) have
addressed the specific areas of vul-
nerability and proposed necessary
standards which, if consistently ap-
plied, would serve to lessen risk of
systemic failure as it now exists.
Rigorous management of the risks
associated with multilateral clear-
ing facilities is of keen interest to
central banks.  Their role as lender
of last resort requires vigilance in
all areas that could threaten the
viability of the world’s financial
markets.  In addition, moral hazard
problems associated with risk-pool-
ing arrangements designed under
the existence of a central bank
“safety net” establish the need for
regulation.  The increasing global-
ization of financial markets serves
to heighten regulators’ concerns;
defaults which affect only one or
two counterparties or only counter-
parties in one jurisdiction are
largely a thing of the past.  Struc-
tures and functions of financial
clearing facilities can vary broadly,
requiring standards that can apply
to the unique risks associated with
the services that individual entities
provide.  Hanley et al. (1995) iden-
tify particular structures for which
the standards would apply; facilities
not meeting a particular descrip-
tion would not be bound by those
standards.
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Sources: The Midwest Manufacturing Index (MMI)
is a composite index of 15 industries, based on
monthly hours worked and kilowatt hours.   IP rep-
resents the Federal Reserve Board industrial pro-
duction index for the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Autos and light trucks are measured in annualized
units, using seasonal adjustments developed by the
Board.  The purchasing managers’ survey data
for the Midwest are weighted averages of the sea-
sonally adjusted production components from the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing Man-
agers’ Association surveys, with assistance from











(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Oct. Month ago Year ago
Cars 6.1 6.2 6.4




Oct. Month ago Year ago
MMI 143.5 143.9 137.9
122.0 125.0 124.7 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Oct. Month ago Year ago
MW 62.0 53.1 68.5
63.9 50.8 48.4 U.S.
1993
Manufacturing activity in the Seventh District continued to improve in October,
despite signs of slowing nationwide.  The production component of the District’s
composite purchasing managers’ index jumped nine points, led in part by gains
in auto-related industries.  The auto component of the Detroit index increased
about twice as much as its overall measure for production.  Light vehicle produc-
tion declined slightly in October, but at about half the nation’s rate.
Preliminary reports for November suggest that District production has begun
to plateau.  Nationally, the purchasing managers’ index for production has
shown contractions (a value below 50) in five of the last seven months
through November.  If auto production in the District continues to contract,
the District may soon follow suit.
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity